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CHARACTER AND CREDIBILITY: A PROPOSAL TO REALIGN
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 608 AND 609
ROBERT D. OKUN*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the bedrock principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence is
that we try cases rather than people.I In accord with this principle, a
jury must consider only the facts of a particular case, not a defendant's
general character or prior bad acts, in reaching a proper verdict.2 This
principle has been codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which pro-
hibit the admissibility of prior crimes or bad acts to prove the general
character of a person or to establish the propensity of a person to com-
mit crimes or bad acts.
3
It also is axiomatic, however, that the primary purpose of a trial is to
discover the truth. 4 This axiom likewise finds expression in the Federal
* Former Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office
for the District of Columbia. B.A. 1981, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1984,
Harvard Law School. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the
author and do not represent the opinion of the United States Attorney's Office
for the District of Columbia.
1. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988) ("[I]n our
system of jurisprudence, we try cases, rather than persons, and thus a jury may
look only to the evidence of the events in question, not to defendants' prior acts
in reaching its verdict.") (citing United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348,
357 (1795)).
2. See id. The rationale for this principle is twofold. As one commentator
has noted:
On a theoretical level, we base our criminal justice on the precept that a
person will be convicted only for what he does, not who he is or what
he has done prior to the events in question. On a practical level, we
will not run the risk of convicting the innocent that a propensity theo-
rem entails.
H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injus-
tice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 868 (1982).
3. The prohibition against this type of propensity evidence is found in Rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Rule states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the ac-
cused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable no-
tice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence
it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
4. See, e.g., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933) (stating that
-[t]he fundamental base on which all rules of evidence rest-if they are to rest
(533)
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Rules of Evidence, which provide that the rules should be interpreted
"to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined."' 5 Consistent with this provision, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence mandate that all relevant evidence be admissible, except as other-
wise proscribed by the rules, the Constitution or congressional
enactments .6
Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence reflect two important jurispru-
dential principles that do not always live in peaceful coexistence. On the
one hand, the rules are designed to maximize the amount of relevant
information we provide to our triers of fact, on the ground that juries
(and judges) should consider all relevant information when determining
what actually occurred in any given case. On the other hand, through
provisions such as the prohibition against propensity evidence, the rules
also are designed to limit the amount of information we provide to our
triers of fact, because certain information, though logically relevant, is
likely to be given too much weight, particularly when the triers of fact
are jurors rather than judges. 7
The uneasy coexistence of these competing principles can be seen
in the interplay between the prohibition against using prior bad acts to
prove propensity and the provisions of Federal Rules of Evidence 608
and 609(a), which allow the use of certain prior bad acts and criminal
convictions to impeach the credibility of a defendant testifying on his or
her own behalf,8 As presently constituted, Rule 609(a)(2) permits a de-
fendant in a criminal case to be impeached with proof of any conviction
that involves dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punish-
on reason-is their adaptation to the successful development of truth"); IA
JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 37.1 (Tillers rev. ed.
1983) (stating that "[m]ost theorizers share the assumption that accurate
factfinding should be the central purpose of the law of evidence").
5. FED. R. EvID. 102. The full text of Rule 102 states: "These rules shall be
construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable ex-
pense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evi-
dence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined." Id.
6. FED. R. EvID. 402. Rule 402 states that "[aill relevant evidence is admis-
sible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by
Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not ad-
missible." Id.
7. Other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence also limit the informa-
tion that can be considered by the trier of fact, in part because of this same fear
that such information will be given too much weight. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 407-
412 (prohibiting, with limited exceptions, admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures, compromises and offers to compromise, payment of medical ex-
penses, pleas, liability insurance, and rape victims' past behavior).
8. Rules 608 and 609 apply to all witnesses, not just defendants in criminal
cases. The focus of this Article, however, will be on the relationship of these two
rules to the criminal defendant who wishes to testify on his or her own behalf.
For the text of Rules 608 and 609(a), see infra notes 9-10.
[Vol. 37: p. 533
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ment; Rule 609(a)(1) allows impeachment with any felony conviction if
the probative value of the conviction outweighs the prejudice to the de-
fendant. 9 Rule 608(b), meanwhile, allows a defendant to be impeached
with specific instances of conduct that have not resulted in convictions,
but only if these specific instances are probative of the defendant's char-
acter for truthfulness.1 0 Thus, Rules 608 and 609 are designed to pro-
vide the trier of fact with evidence about the defendant's credibility if he
or she testifies, and to exclude evidence that is too indirectly related to
the defendant's credibility or too likely to cause impermissible propen-
sity inferences.
Many commentators, however, have criticized the balance struck by
the Rules to accommodate these competing interests and have argued
9. FED. R. EvID. 609(a). Rule 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was pun-
ishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused
has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court deter-
mines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
Id. Rule 609 was amended in 1990. The amendment made two changes to the
Rule. See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note (stating that first change
removed limitation that conviction may only be elicited on cross-examination;
second change resolved ambiguity concerning impeachment of witnesses other
than criminal defendant). For further discussion of Rule 609, see infra notes 39-
46 and accompanying text.
10. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Rule 608 provides:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility
of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of
opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence
may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and
(2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character
of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputa-
tion evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct
of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness'
credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discre-
tion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be in-
quired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning
the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to
which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other
witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness'
privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to mat-
ters which relate only to credibility.
Id. For further discussion of Rule 608, see infra notes 52-57 and accompanying
text.
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for greater restrictions on the use of criminal convictions to impeach a
defendant's credibility.' These arguments have been supported by an
extensive body of scientific research demonstrating that convictions and
bad acts are poor indicators of a person's veracity on the witness
stand,' 2 that the admissibility of convictions and prior bad acts can sub-
stantially prejudice a criminal defendant,13 and that limiting instructions
do not cure the prejudice against a defendant who is impeached with
prior instances of misconduct.14
On the other hand, there are countervailing reasons to continue the
practice of impeachment with prior convictions and bad acts in certain
situations. First, a blanket prohibition against impeachment with prior
crimes or bad acts would seriously skew the truth-finding process in
cases where a defendant presents evidence to show that he or she is a
truthful or law-abiding person. 15 Second, the practice of impeachment
with prior crimes and bad acts is consistent with what has been variously
described as "common sense," "intuition," and "social consensus." 16
11. See, e.g., James E. Beaver & Steven L. Marques, A Proposal to Modify the
Rule on Criminal Conviction Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585 (1985) (arguing for
revision of Rule 609 that would exclude virtually all evidence of criminal defend-
ants' prior convictions); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal
Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 391 (1980)(examining potential prejudice and constitutional violations under Rule 609);
Robert G. Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior Convictions and the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, 1 Loy. U.
CHi. L.J. 247 (1970) (arguing against Rule 609 as originally proposed on ground
that impeachment of criminal defendant by evidence of past convictions
presents serious problems; advocating adoption of Luck doctrine which directed
trial court to exercise discretion in determining whether to admit past convic-
tions of defendant-witness and outlining factors to be considered by trial judge);
Ed Gainor, Note, Character Evidence by Any Other Name ... : A Proposal to Limit
Impeachment by Prior Conviction Under Rule 609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762 (1990)
(arguing for revision of Rule 609(a) that would limit use of evidence of prior
convictions for impeachment purposes to crimes bearing directly on criminal
defendant's credibility).
Although most of the legal commentary has focused on impeachment with
prior convictions, many of the criticisms of such impeachment apply with similar
force to impeachment with prior bad acts that were not the subject of convic-
tions. See, e.g., Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommendation
for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 n.16 (1988) (recognizing that criticisms of
use of prior conviction evidence are "equally applicable" to use of prior bad acts
evidence). Therefore, this author regards research that has focused only on im-
peachment with prior convictions to be applicable to both convictions and non-
conviction bad acts.
12. For a discussion of this research, see infra notes 62-73 and accompany-
ing text.
13. For a discussion of this prejudice, see infra notes 77-94 and accompany-
ing text.
14. For a discussion of limiting instructions in this context, see infra notes
95-107 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of reasons to continue the use of prior convictions, see
infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
16. See Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating "the
4
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Although these terms may not comport with current psychological the-
ory on this issue, they cannot be disregarded entirely in the formulation
of rules that depend upon community consensus for their acceptance
and continued vitality.
The purpose of this Article, therefore, is not to call for a complete
elimination of impeachment under Rules 608 and 609, but to urge that
such impeachment be limited to those situations where a defendant af-
firmatively places his or her character for truthful or law-abiding behav-
ior in issue. Impeachment under these circumstances clearly would
further the truth-seeking process and also would present the smallest
risk that the trier of fact will engage in impermissible propensity
inferences.
The remainder of this Article is divided into five sections: Parts II
and III discuss the evolution of impeachment with prior convictions and
bad acts and the current scope of these practices under the Federal
Rules of Evidence; 17 Part IV reviews the criticisms that have been di-
rected towards the practice of impeachment with prior convictions and
bad acts, focusing on the psychological and social science research con-
ducted on these practices;' 8 Part V addresses some of the countervailing
reasons supporting the practice of impeachment with prior convictions
and bad acts;19 and Part VI sets forth a proposed revision of the Federal
Rules governing impeachment with prior convictions and bad acts.
20
This proposed revision attempts to incorporate both the criticisms
against impeachment with prior convictions and bad acts and the rea-
sons supporting these impeachment practices.
II. USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
609
A. Historical Background
At common law, a convicted felon "was not competent to testify as a
witness."' 21 Although this disqualification was originally "part of the
punishment for the crime," it subsequently was rationalized on the the-
ory that a convicted felon "was not worthy of belief."' 22 As the law
common sense proposition that a [convicted felon] .. .is less likely than other
members of society to be deterred from lying under oath"); David P. Leonard,
The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence,
58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 32, 43 (1986) (stating that law of evidence relies to great
extent "on hunch and intuition in deriving rules").
17. See infra notes 21-57 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 58-108 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 109-46 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
21. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989) (reviewing
history leading to enactment of Rule 609).
22. Id. (quoting 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's
EVIDENCE 609[02] (1988) (citing 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519 (3d ed.
19921 537
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evolved, however, this automatic disqualification was supplanted by
rules that allowed convicted felons to testify, but also provided that
these witnesses could be impeached with proof of their prior convic-
tions. 23 The rules on this subject varied among jurisdictions, but the
most common rule prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, in both federal and state courts, mandated the admissibility of all
prior felony convictions and all prior convictions for "crimen falsi," re-
gardless of the punishment.2 4
Starting roughly in the middle of this century, some efforts were
made to restrict the practice of impeachment by prior convictions. For
example, in 1942, the American Law Institute proposed a rule that
would have prohibited evidence of a prior conviction from being intro-
duced against a criminal defendant unless the defendant first introduced
"evidence for the sole purpose of supporting his credibility."-25 Simi-
larly, in 1953, the National Conference of Commissioners proposed a
rule that would have permitted impeachment of a witness other than the
criminal defendant only with prior convictions involving dishonesty or
false statement, and would have allowed impeachment of a prior crimi-
nal defendant only if the defendant first presented evidence solely to
1940))); see also Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1924) (ex-
plaining that disqualification existed because convicted criminals were "so desti-
tute of moral honesty that truth could not within them dwell").
23. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 511-12. The common law disqualification was
revoked in the federal courts in 1917. See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467
(1917) (holding common law rule disqualifying convicted felons from testifying
inapplicable for determining witness competency).
24. See Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 512 (citing 10JAMES W. MOORE & HELEN I.
BENDIX, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 609.02 (2d ed. 1988)). "Crimen falsi" is
a term that originated under Roman law and included "not only forgery, but
every species of fraud and deceit." United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362
n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 373 & n.3 (16th ed. 1899)). At common law, however, the term had
a more limited meaning, encompassing only those crimes that supposedly bore
directly on credibility, and that were directly tied to the judicial process. Id. at
362-63 n.26 (quoting Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423 (1885); GREENLEAF,
supra, § 373).
25. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 106(3) (1942). The proposed rule
stated:
If an accused who testifies at the trial introduces no evidence for the
sole purpose of supporting his credibility, no evidence concerning his
commission or conviction of crime shall, for the sole purpose of impair-
ing his credibility, be elicited on his cross-examination or be otherwise
introduced against him; if he introduces evidence for the sole purpose
of supporting his credibility, all evidence admissible under Paragraph
(1) shall be admissible against him.
Id. Paragraph (1) of the proposed rule prohibited admission of extrinsic evi-
dence of a witness' "conviction of crime not involving dishonesty or false state-
ment, or ... of specific instances of [a witness'] conduct relevant only as tending
to prove a trait of his character." Id. Rule 106(1)(b), (c). Thus, under the Model
Code, only prior convictions involving false statements or dishonesty could be
admitted.
6
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bolster his or her credibility. 26
The first major restriction on impeachment by prior conviction by a
federal court appeared in 1965 in Luck v. United States.2 7 In that case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the District of Columbia Code did not mandate the admission of
prior convictions offered to impeach a criminal defendant. 28 Instead,
the court held that trial courts should employ a balancing test to deter-
mine whether to admit prior convictions for impeachment purposes. 2 9
Under this test, trial courts were directed to consider several factors,
including:
the nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal rec-
ord, the age and circumstances of the defendant, and, above
all, the extent to which it is more important to the search for
truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant's
story than to know of a prior conviction. 30
In reaching this holding, the Luck court emphasized that the determina-
tion of admissibility was discretionary and that it was relying on the ex-
26. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 21 (1953). This rule stated:
Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not involving dis-
honesty or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose of im-
pairing his credibility. If the witness be the accused in a criminal
proceeding, no evidence of his conviction of a crime shall be admissible
for the sole purpose of impairing his credibility unless he has first intro-
duced evidence admissible solely for the purpose of supporting his
credibility.
Id.
27. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
28. Id. at 768. The trial court had admitted evidence of the defendant's
prior grand larceny conviction for impeachment purposes. Id. at 766-67. Luck
argued that the trial court should have excluded this evidence because the con-
viction had occurred while he was a juvenile, and specific provisions of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code were "designed to relieve proceedings in the Juvenile
Court from the consequences which customarily accompany conviction of crime
in a tribunal of general jurisdiction." Id. at 767. The court of appeals rejected
this argument. Id. at 767-69. The appellate court, however, also rejected what it
believed to be an implicit argument of the government-that the prosecution "is
always entitled to introduce ajuvenile's earlier conviction." Id. The court stated
that the statute's use of the word "may," as opposed to "shall," was significant,
and "[t]he trial court is not required to allow impeachment by prior conviction
every time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense." Id. at 768 (quoting
14 D.C. CODE § 305 (1961)).
29. Id. at 768-69. According to the court: "The statute, in our view, leaves
room for the operation of a sound judicial discretion to play upon the circum-
stances as they unfold in a particular case." Id. at 768.
30. Id. at 769 (footnote omitted). The court stated that "[t]he goal of a
criminal trial is the disposition of the charge in accordance with the truth." Id.
In line with this goal, the court implied that another factor for a trial court to
consider is "the possibility of a rehearsal of the defendant's criminal record in a
given case, especially if it means that the jury will be left without one version of
the truth." Id.
7
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perience of trial judges to balance the interests of the defendant against
the public interest.3
1
Two years after Luck, the District of Columbia Circuit clarified the
factors to be considered by trial courts in applying the Luck balancing
test. In Gordon v. United States,3 2 the court set forth five factors for con-
sideration: the degree to which the prior conviction is probative of ve-
racity; the age of the prior conviction; the similarity between the prior
conviction and the crime charged; the importance of the defendant's tes-
timony; and the importance of the issue of credibility.33 In weighing
these factors, the court noted that crimes involving dishonest conduct,
such as fraud, cheating and stealing, relate more directly to credibility
than violent or assaultive crimes, and that prior convictions that have
occurred long ago have less bearing on the witness' present credibility
than more recent convictions. 34 The court also warned that prior con-
victions for the same crime as the charged crime should be "admitted
sparingly." 35 Finally, the court pointed out that there is greater reason
to admit prior convictions when a case has been "narrowed down to the
credibility of two persons-the accused and his accuser."
36
31. Id.
32. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
33. Id. at 940-41. Before outlining these factors, the court first emphasized
the rationale of Luck: "[A] showing of prior convictions can have genuine proba-
tive value on the issue of credibility, but . . . because of the potential for preju-
dice, the receiving of such convictions as impeachment [i]s discretionary." Id. at
939. The court then reiterated the Luck test:
[T]o bar [criminal convictions] as impeachment, the court must find
that the prejudice must "far outweigh" the probative relevance to cred-
ibility, or that even if relevant the "cause of truth would be helped
more by letting the jury hear the defendant's story than by the defend-
ant's foregoing that opportunity because of the fear of prejudice
founded upon a prior conviction."
Id. (quoting Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (1965)). The court also
noted that the legitimate purpose of impeachment is "not to show that the ac-
cused who takes the stand is a 'bad' person but rather to show background facts
which bear directly on whether jurors ought to believe him rather than other and
conflicting witnesses." Id. at 940.
34. Id.
35. Id. The court explained that evidence of prior convictions of the same
crime may be prejudicial to the defendant "because of the inevitable pressure on
lay jurors to believe that 'if he did it before he probably did so this time.' " Id.
36. Id. at 941. This proposition has been criticized by many commentators
who have noted that there is a greater need for the defendant's testimony when the
case has been narrowed down to a credibility contest between the accused and
his or her accuser. See, e.g., Roderick Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to Applying the "Balancing" Provi-
sion of Rule 609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 907, 943 (1980) (admitting evidence of
prior conviction in such context helps in assessment of defendant's credibility,
but discourages defendant from testifying); Bruce P. Garren, Note, Impeachment
by Prior Conviction: Adjusting to Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
416, 435 n.114 (1979) (recognizing that "as the need for the defendant's testi-
mony becomes more critical, so does the credibility issue").
[Vol. 37: p. 533540
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The Luck rule, however, was short-lived in the District of Columbia.
In 1970, Congress explicitly rejected this balancing test when it
amended the District of Columbia Code to mandate the admissibility of a
conviction for any felony and for any crime involving dishonesty or false
statement. 3 7 Nonetheless, this rule did inform the debate over the
proper scope of impeachment for the proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and also served as the prototype for Rule 609.38
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 609
Rule 609 was "one of the most hotly contested provisions in the
Federal Rules of Evidence," and its "labyrinthine history" has been
thoroughly documented by many courts and commentators. 3 9 For pur-
poses of this Article, it is sufficient to note that the Rule as originally
enacted was a "political compromise" between the discretionary ap-
proach embodied in Luck and the mandatory admissibility prevalent in
the federal and state courts. 40
The Rule, as originally enacted in 1975, mandated the admissibility
of prior convictions "involv[ing] dishonesty or false statement, regard-
less of the punishment," but gave courts discretion to exclude any prior
felony conviction, other than those involving dishonesty or false state-
ment, if the court determined that the probative value of the conviction
was outweighed by its prejudicial effect to the defendant. 4 1 The Rule
37. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305(b)(1) (1980) (providing that "for the pur-
pose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been
convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted . . . if the criminal offense
(A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved dishonesty or false statement
[regardless of punishment]" (emphasis added)).
38. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's Evi-
DENCE, 609[04] (1988) (stating that Rule 609 has its genesis in Luck doctrine
and therefore courts still look to cases construing Luck for guidance).
39. United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting that
current language of Rule 609 is product of careful deliberation and compro-
mise); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511-24 (1989)
(providing detailed history of Rule 609); STEVEN A. SALTZBURG & KENNETH R.
REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 634 (3d ed. 1982) (stating that
"[p]robably no single Rule provoked as much controversy as Rule 609"); 3
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, 609[01], 609[07]-[19] (documenting his-
tory of Rule 609).
40. Surratt, supra note 36, at 917 (quoting Irving Younger, Three Essays on
Character and Credibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 7, 11
(1976)). Surratt suggests that the rule may also "be viewed as a 'compromise'
between the traditional approach, i.e., no limitation on prior-conviction im-
peachment of the criminal defendant, and the 'Hawaii approach,' i.e., an abso-
lute prohibition of prior-conviction impeachment of the criminal defendant."
Id. (footnote omitted). Surratt noted that only two states, Hawaii and Kansas,
had embraced the "Hawaii approach." Id. at 912, 914 & n.21.
41. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a), 28 U.S.C. Rule 609(a) (1988). The rule provided:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
9
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also set forth time limits on the admissibility of prior convictions, stating
that prior convictions more than ten years old were not admissible un-
less the court determined that the probative value of the convictions
substantially outweighed their prejudicial effect. 4 2 In addition, the pro-
ponent of the evidence was required to give written notice of his or her
intent to use a conviction more than ten years old.43
In 1990, Rule 609(a) was amended to provide all witnesses, not just
criminal defendants, with some degree of protection from the admission
of felony convictions that did not involve dishonesty or false state-
ment. 44 The Rule still distinguishes, however, between the use of prior
felony convictions to impeach a criminal defendant and the use of such
convictions to impeach other witnesses. Specifically, the amended Rule
prohibits the impeachment of a criminal defendant with a felony convic-
tion that does not involve dishonesty or false statement, unless the pro-
bative value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. 4 5 All
other witnesses can be impeached with such convictions as long as the
prejudice resulting from the impeachment does not substantially out-
weigh its probative value. 4 6
Therefore, as Rule 609(a) currently stands, the credibility of a crim-
from the witness or established by public record during cross-examina-
tion but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was con-
victed, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) in-
volved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Id.
42. Fed. R. Evid. 609(b), 28 U.S.C. Rule 609(b) (1988).
43. Id.
44. See FED. R. EvID. 609(a). The 1990 amended rule was drafted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States and was forwarded by the Supreme
Court to Congress on January 26, 1990. See Amendments to Federal Rules of
Evidence-Rule 609, 110 S. Ct. 774, 776, 778-79 (setting forth proposed
amendment to Rule 609; showing new and deleted material). The amendments
went into effect on December 1, 1990 after Congress did not act to disapprove
the amendments or delay their effective date. FED. R. EVID. 609(a); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988) (stating that "[sluch rule shall take effect no earlier than
December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise
provided by law").
The rule was amended in 1990, at least in part, to overrule the Supreme
Court's decision in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527
(1989), holding that the balancing test set forth in Rule 609(a) only protected
criminal defendants, and that evidence of prior felony convictions was automati-
cally admissible against all other witnesses. See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory com-
mittee's note (stating that danger of unfair prejudice is not confined to criminal
defendants). For the text of Rule 609(a), see supra note 9.
45. FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1).
46. Id. Rule 609(a)(1) permits the admissibility of evidence that "a witness
other than an accused has been convicted of" a felony, but such evidence is also
subject to Rule 403. Id. Rule 403 excludes otherwise relevant, admissible evi-
dence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." FED. R. EVID. 403.
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inal defendant can automatically be impeached with any conviction in-
volving dishonesty or false statement, but can be impeached with felony
convictions that do not involve dishonesty or false statement only if
these convictions satisfy a balancing test similar to the test first spelled
out in Luck and Gordon. Thus, Rule 609(a) places greater limits on the
use of prior convictions than the federal courts generally imposed prior
to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Nonetheless, Rule
609's standard of admissibility is still more permissive than the standard
set forth in Rule 608-the rule governing the admissibility of specific
instances of conduct that can be used to attack a witness' character for
truthfulness.
III. USE OF SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF MISCONDUCT UNDER FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 608
A. Historical Background
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, specific in-
stances of misconduct, other than convictions, were rarely admissible in
federal court to impeach a witness' credibility. 4 7 Undue delay and prej-
udice to the witness were the most commonly cited reasons underlying
this prohibition. 4 8 The exceptions to this prohibition were usually lim-
ited to specific acts of misconduct that were relevant to veracity or
honesty.4
9
Furthermore, in the limited situations where a cross-examiner was
47. See United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1954) (stating
that "specific acts of misconduct not resulting in conviction ... are [generally]
not [held to be] the proper subject of cross-examination for impeachment pur-
poses"); SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 39, at 603 (stating that prior to Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, "most Federal Circuits held that a witness could not be
asked whether or not he committed prior bad acts not the subject of criminal
convictions, while most states permitted some form of impeachment by prior
bad acts"); John R. Schmertz, Jr., The First Decade Under Article VI of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: Some Suggested Amendments to Fill Gaps and Cure Confusion, 30 VILL.
L. REV. 1367, 1425 & nn.223-25 (1985) (stating that "[p]rior misconduct im-
peachment ... was disfavored in the federal courts prior to the enactment of the
Federal Rules").
48. See 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, 608[05] (stating that
"[w]hen the bad conduct is the subject of a conviction, the need to prove the
underlying behavior is absent and the ensuing possibility of confusing the jury
and protracting the trial . . . is eliminated"). Another possible reason for this
limitation stems from the fact that certain courts misinterpreted Michelson v.
United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), where the Court stated: "Only a conviction
... may be used to undermine the trustworthiness of a witness." Id. 608[05] &
n.38 (quoting Michelson, 335 U.S. at 482). According to Weinstein, "[t]he Court
was not considering whether a witness could be questioned as to a bad act not
the subject of conviction"; rather, the Court believed that a mere arrest, as op-
posed to a bad act independent of the arrest, could not be used to impeach
credibility. Id. 608[05].
49. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, 608[05] & nn.40-42 (examin-
ing exceptions to general rule of inadmissibility of bad acts).
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allowed to question a witness about specific instances of misconduct, the
cross-examiner could not introduce extrinsic evidence to prove the par-
ticular acts-even if the witness denied committing the acts on cross-
examination. 50 The prohibition against extrinsic evidence, like the pro-
hibition against cross-examination about such instances, was based on
considerations of undue delay, confusion of the issues, and the preju-
dice to the defendant that would result from having to defend against
misdeeds not contained in the formal charges. 5 1
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b)
Rule 608(b) was the subject of much less debate than Rule 609. For
the most part, Rule 608(b) codified existing federal court practices con-
cerning impeachment by specific acts of misconduct. 5 2 As enacted, the
Rule allows impeachment with specific instances of misconduct, in the
discretion of the trial court, if these instances of misconduct are proba-
tive of the witness' character for truthfulness. 5 3 Rule 608(b) does not
distinguish between the criminal defendant and other witnesses. 54 Nor
50. See id. (stating that cross-examiner could not call other witnesses to
prove misconduct after denial by witness); KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE § 42 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter Mc-
CORMICK] (stating that "if the witness stands his ground and denies the alleged
misconduct, the examiner must 'take his answer,' not that he may not further
cross-examine to extract an admission, but in the sense that he may not call
other witnesses to prove the discrediting act").
51. See Mason Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IOWA L.
REV. 498, 508-09 (1939) (viewing objection to use of specific acts to prove char-
acter of person as based on time and confusion which would result from going
into collateral issues and policy consideration against requiring defendant to de-
fend against all events of his or her life rather than particular charge in case).
52. See, e.g., SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 39, at 603 (stating that
"[p]rior bad act impeachment [was] the product of little debate and may have
escaped the attention of many members of Congress who had a fixation on Rule
609").
53. FED. R. EvID. 608(b). The Rule states:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attack-
ing or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of a
crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the
witness (1) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
of another witness, or (2) concerning the witness' character for truthful-
ness or untruthfulness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other
witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness'
privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to mat-
ters which relate only to credibility.
Id. An earlier draft of the Rule required that the instances of misconduct be
"clearly" probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness; the word "clearly" was de-
leted before the final enactment of the Rule. See 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 38, 608[02].
54. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
[Vol. 37: p. 533
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does it establish time limits for the admissibility of the prior acts evi-
dence.55 In addition, the Rule prohibits the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to prove the existence of any of the specific instances of mis-
conduct used to impeach a witness' character for truthfulness.
56
Thus, Rule 608(b) limits impeachment by specific instances of mis-
conduct to instances that are directly relevant to the witness' character
for truthfulness, and strictly limits the use of extrinsic evidence to prove
such misconduct. By contrast, Rule 609(a) allows impeachment with
convictions for crimes that bear only a marginal relationship to the wit-
ness' veracity. Although numerous courts have allowed such impeach-
ment under Rule 609 under the theory that most felony convictions do
have a bearing on a witness' credibility, a considerable body of psycho-
logical and social science literature casts serious doubt on that
assumption. 5 7
IV. THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON IMPEACHMENT WITH PRIOR
CONVICTIONS AND BAD ACTS
The rationale underlying the impeachment of a criminal defendant
with prior convictions and bad acts is that these instances of misconduct
have a direct bearing on the defendant's credibility as a witness. As
Judge Weinstein has noted, this rationale is based upon a two-part as-
sumption: "(1) that a person with a criminal past has a bad general char-
acter and (2) that a person with a bad general character is the sort of
person who would disregard the obligation to testify truthfully."' 58
This assumption-that a person's general character is directly tied
55. See id. An earlier draft of Rule 608 required that the prior acts not be
"remote in time"; this requirement was deleted from the final language of the
Rule. See id. historical note (citing notes of Committee on the Judiciary, H.R.
REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)) (noting that Rule was amended to
emphasize discretionary power of court in permitting such testimony and that
reference to remoteness in time was deleted as "unnecessary and confusing").
56. See FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
57. See Gainor, Note, supra note 11, at 780-81 (citing recent federal cases
which have held it proper to impeach defendant with past conviction of same
crime); see also United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 1987) (up-
holding admission of evidence of prior bank robbery conviction in trial for
armed bank robbery), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 991 (1988); United States v. Fountain,
642 F.2d 1083, 1092 (7th Cir.) (upholding admission of evidence of prior mur-
der conviction in trial for killing prisoner in U.S. prison), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
993 (1981).
58. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, 609[02]. Justice Holmes also
agreed:
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the
only ground for disbelieving him ... is the general readiness to do evil
which the conviction may be supposed to show .... The evidence has
no tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has per-
jured himself, and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general
proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit.
Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
1992] 545
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to his or her credibility-is an assumption with considerable intuitive
appeal. 59 For example, our common sense tells us that a convicted mur-
derer would be more likely to lie on the witness stand than Mother The-
resa. 60 Likewise, to the extent that trials are a search for the truth, it
seems intuitively obvious that the triers of fact should know whether a
witness (whose credibility they are necessarily evaluating) has eight prior
felony convictions or an unblemished criminal record. Indeed, as one
court has noted, "[n]o sufficient reason appears why the jury should not
be informed what sort of person is asking them to take his word. In
transactions of everyday life this is probably the first thing that they
would wish to know. '"6 1
Nonetheless, a large body of scientific research has been developed
over the last thirty years that calls into question this common sense no-
tion that a person's general character is closely tied to his or her honesty
on the witness stand. Furthermore, this research shows that a defendant
who is impeached with prior convictions or bad acts is likely to be se-
verely prejudiced by this impeachment because the jury, despite limiting
instructions to the contrary, will conclude that the defendant is the type
of person who commits crimes, regardless of the evidence in the particu-
lar case. Finally, there is considerable research demonstrating that a de-
fendant who faces the possibility of impeachment is less likely to testify
on his or her own behalf. This decision not to testify reduces the chance
of acquittal because the jury is likely to infer guilt from silence, again
despite limiting instructions to the contrary. Thus, the assumptions un-
derlying the practice of impeachment with prior convictions and bad
acts, though they may be intuitive, simply are not supported by the sci-
entific research on the issue.
A. Probative Value
Psychological theory in the first half of this century supported the
notion that prior convictions and bad acts were predictive of a person's
credibility. Indeed, the prevalent psychological theory during that time
59. See Foster, supra note 11, at 27 n.1 17 (stating that "[t]he intuitive appeal
of character traits as the source of human behavior traces its roots at least as far
back as Aristotle").
60. Courts also have relied on this "common sense" notion. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "Rule 609
and the common law tradition out of which it evolved rest on the common-sense
proposition that a person who has flouted society's most fundamental norms...
is less likely than other members of society to be deterred from lying under oath
in a trial"); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(McKinnon, J., concurring) (stating that "convicted felons are not generally per-
mitted to stand pristine before a jury with the same credibility as that of a
Mother Superior").
61. State v. Duke, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (N.H. 1956); see also United States v.
Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating that "the jury should be in-
formed about the character of a witness who asks the jury to believe his
testimony").
546 [Vol. 37: p. 533
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period postulated that personality was determined by "character traits,"
and that these traits produced generally consistent behavior in divergent
situations. 6 2 Under this theory, a person who has a "trait" for unlawful
behavior (as evidenced by prior convictions and bad acts) is more likely
than a person without such a trait to engage in unlawful behavior in the
future. As one commentator described this theory, "a person who lies
in one situation is not only likely to lie in other situations, but is also
highly likely to cheat, steal, not feel guilty, and so on."' 6 3
Subsequent psychological research, however, has generally discred-
ited this "trait theory" of personality, and has replaced it with theories
that view behavior as a "learned response to specific contextual factors"
(situationism) or as the interaction between specific character traits and
specific contextual factors (interactionism). 64 In fact, numerous studies
have cast substantial doubt on the proposition that personality is deter-
mined by "traits" that produce consistent behavior in different situa-
tions. 65
In a study by Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May, more than 11,000
children were monitored over a five-year period to see if they exhibited
the trait of honesty in more than 100 different situations. 66 The study,
which has been described as "a landmark which has not been surpassed
by later work," 6 7 showed that thousands of subjects exhibited no unified
62. See, e.g., GORDON W. ALLPORT, PERSONALITY-A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTER-
PRETATION (1937). Gordon Allport, Associate Professor of Psychology at
Harvard University, wrote that "[s]carcely anyone has ever thought of question-
ing the existence of traits as the fundamental dispositions of personality." Id. at
286. According to Professor Allport, "[a] trait guides the course of behavior."
Id. at 293.
63. Roger V. Burton, Generality of Honesty Reconsidered, 70 PSYCHOL. REV.
481,482 (1963). Burton described this theory as a "unidimensional approach to
the explanation of moral behavior." Id. Under this approach, "a person is, or
strongly tends to be, consistent in his behavior over many different kinds of situ-
ations." Id. Burton contrasted this approach with the "doctrine of specificity of
moral behavior [which] holds that a person acts in each situation according to
the way he has been taught to act under these particular conditions." Id. Under
Burton's theory, the morality of a person's behavior in any given situation de-
pends upon the factual circumstances of that situation. Id.
64. Foster, supra note 11, at 29-31 (describing situationism and interaction-
ism as two theories which have replaced trait theory in scientific behavioral the-
ory); Robert G. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable
Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME L.Aw. 758, 781-83 (1975) (describing scientific commu-
nity's rejection of trait theory in favor of "theory of specificity" (situationism) or
"modified trait theory" (interactionism)).
65. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 64, at 781-82 & nn.119-20 (quoting theo-
rists whose studies have repudiated scientific support for trait theory).
66. Id. at 783 (citing 1 HUGH HARTSHORNE & MARK A. MAY, STUDIES IN THE
NATURE OF CHARACTER-STUDIES IN DECEIT (1928)).
67. H.J. EYSENCK, THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN PERSONALITY 227 (2d ed.
1960).
19921
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character trait for honesty. 68 Some subjects, for example, cheated only
in classroom contexts; other subjects cheated only in extracurricular
contexts.
69
The authors of the study concluded: "IN]either deceit nor its oppo-
site, 'honesty,' are unified character traits, but rather specific functions
of life situations .... Lying, cheating, and stealing as measured by the
test situations used in these studies are only very loosely related."' 70
Even Gordon Allport, the pioneer of trait theory, later reconsidered his
reliance on character traits as an exclusive predictor of behavior. All-
port noted that his "earlier views seemed to neglect the variability in-
duced by ecological, social, and situational factors. This oversight needs
to be repaired through an adequate theory that will relate the inside [the
psychic structure] and outside [situational factors] systems more
accurately." 71
These findings are mirrored by the observations of many courts and
commentators who also have questioned the connection between testi-
monial credibility and crimes that .do not involve dishonesty or false
statement. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently noted
that there is "[p]rodigious scholarship highlighting the irrationality and
unfairness of impeaching credibility with evidence of felonies unrelated
to veracity." 72  Numerous commentators have echoed these
sentiments. 73
The courts and commentators have stressed two major shortcom-
ings in the theory that all prior convictions and bad acts are probative of
a witness' credibility. The first shortcoming is that many convictions and
bad acts, particularly those involving violent crimes, bear little relation
68. Foster, supra note 11, at 29 n. 132 (describing results of Hartshorne &
May study).
69. Id. (stating that researchers could find no consistent pattern concerning
whether students would cheat, or under what circumstances students would
cheat).
70. 1 HuGH HARTSHORNE & MARK A. MAY, STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHAR-
ACTER-STUDIES IN DECEIT 411 (1928). Other scientists agree with this conclu-
sion. According to one scientist: "Individuals show far less cross-situational
consistency in their behavior than has been assumed by trait-state theories. The
more dissimilar the evoking situations, the less likely they are to lead to similar
or consistent responses from the same individual. Even seemingly trivial situa-
tional differences may reduce correlations to zero." WALTER MISCHEL, PERSON-
ALITY AND ASSESSMENT 177 (1968).
71. Lawson, supra note 64, at 783 (quoting Gordon Allport, Traits Revisited,
21 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 2 (1966)).
72. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524 (1988).
73. See, e.g., 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, 609[02] (stating that
"[m]any crimes ... do not upon analysis support the inference that the person
who committed them has a specific proclivity for lying on the witness stand");
Beaver & Marques, supra note 11, at 611 (arguing that evidence of prior convic-
tion often does not show "lack of veracity"); Garren, Note, supra note 36, at 433-
34 (arguing for per se exclusion of "[r]emote non-crimen falsi evidence" and
evidence of prior convictions for like crimes).
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to a person's propensity to lie.74 An example is the case of the husband
who is convicted of killing his wife when he discovers that she has been
sleeping with another man, and who then openly admits that he killed
his wife because she betrayed him. Under the current Rules, this convic-
tion will become evidence of his dishonesty in all future proceedings,
even though the crime he committed did not involve dishonesty, and
even though he never tried to hide his commission of the crime. 75
The second shortcoming of the theory linking convictions and cred-
ibility is that most convictions are the result of guilty pleas, where the
defendant admits in open court that he or she committed the crime to
which he or she is pleading guilty. 76 While there may be numerous con-
siderations other than honesty which impel a defendant to plead guilty
(such as the availability of a favorable plea bargain), the fact remains that
most defendants who plead guilty are honestly and openly admitting
their involvement in the commission of a crime rather than lying on the
witness stand in an attempt to avoid punishment.
Thus, there are significant questions about the probative value of
prior convictions and bad acts on a witness' credibility, particularly when
those convictions and bad acts do not involve dishonesty or false state-
ment. These questions are exacerbated by the fact that a criminal de-
fendant can be substantially prejudiced by the use of these convictions
and bad acts, especially when the prior instances of misconduct are the
same or similar to the offenses for which the defendant is being tried.
74. For example, in United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
There is no deceit in armed robbery. You take a gun, walk out, and put
it in a man's face and say, "Give me your money," or walk up to a cash-
ier and say, "This is a holdup; give me your money." There is no deceit
in that. They are not lying. They mean business.
Id. at 363 (quoting statements of Senator McClellan, 120 CONG. REC. 37,081
(1974)); see also Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(stating that "[a]cts of violence ...which may result from a short temper, a
combative nature, extreme provocation or other causes, generally have little or
no direct bearing on honesty or veracity"); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note
38, 609[02] (stating that "[t]he relationship between crimes of violence and
truth-telling is particularly tenuous").
75. In State v. McAboy, 236 S.E.2d 431, 435 n.6 (W.Va. 1977), the West
Virginia Supreme Court noted a similar paradox of "a man so proud of his
truthfulness that he challenges a person who called him a liar to a duel. He wins
the duel but is subsequently convicted of murder .... If he elects to testify, he
knows that his propensity to lie will be evidenced by his prior conviction."
76. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 767
(1985) (noting that approximately 90% of all convictions result from guilty
pleas). This factor does not affect the connection between credibility and non-
conviction bad acts. As two commentators have recognized: "One must keep in
mind that the state obtains over ninety percent of all convictions by guilty pleas
entered by the accused. Therefore, a defendant's past conviction in many in-
stances represents a prior admission of guilt-probably a truthful act." Beaver
& Marques, supra note 11, at 611 (footnotes omitted).
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B. Prejudice to the Defendant
Psychological theorists have long postulated that people construct
integrated images of other people's personalities even when they have
little information about most aspects of' those personalities. 7 7 Under
this theory, when people receive information about one characteristic of
a person, they attribute other characteristics to that person that they be-
lieve are consistent with the first characteristic. 78 This attributional ten-
dency is particularly powerful when people receive noteworthy or
unusual information about an individual. 7 9 Furthermore, many psychol-
ogists have noted that negative information is likely to be more impor-
tant than positive information when people form perceptions about
people they do not otherwise know.80
Attribution theory, therefore, is quite relevant in the setting of a
criminal trial when a defendant is impeached with prior convictions or
77. See, e.g., PHILIP E. VERNON, PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT: A CRITICAL SUR-
VEY 32-33 (1964) (stating that people tend to view other people as a "unitary
whole, however fragmentary the clues"); S.E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Person-
ality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 258 (1946) (analyzing formation of per-
sonality impression based on perceived characteristics); Gustav Ichheiser,
Misunderstandings in Human Relations: A Study in False Social Perceptions, 55 AM. J.
Soc. 1, 28 (1949) (stating that "we have the tendency to consider a partial struc-
ture of personality which happens to be visible to us as if this partial structure
were the total personality 'itself' "). This theory, referred to as the "theory of
unified impressions," has been tested and validated in numerous clinical set-
tings. Lawson, supra note 64, at 774.
78. See Robert G. Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L.
REV. 334, 352 (1979). This theory also is referred to as the "attribution theory."
Id. In addressing this subject, Spector stated: "What happens when a person
receives one specific piece of information about another person? Does the re-
ceiver simply record the data and reserve judgment, or will the receiver genera-
lize from the specific piece of information to postulate a whole personality?
Research shows that it is quite clearly the latter." Id.
79. See ALLPORT, supra note 62, at 521. Allport explains that "[o]ne out-
standing 'good' or 'bad' quality in a person casts its reflection upon all judg-
ments passing to him." Id. This tendency to extrapolate characteristics from a
particular piece of noteworthy information has been referred to as the "halo
effect." Id.; see also Foster, supra note 11, at 34 (stating that "[i]f one dominant
character trait is found-often inferred from a specific act-the observer extrap-
olates other, similar characteristics, and assumes that these characteristics are
part of the observed person's character").
80. See, e.g., Barbara Black Koltuv, Some Characteristics of Intrajudge Trait In-
tercorrelations, PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS, May 1963, at 1, 3 (stating that "a single
negative trait is more prepotent than its opposite positive"); Irwin P. Levin et al.,
Differential Weighting of Positive and Negative Traits in Impression Formation as a Func-
tion of Prior Exposure, 97J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 114, 114 (1973) (stating that
"[a] number of studies of personality impression formation have shown that
negative traits have more influence on an impression response than do positive
traits"). But see Eugene A. Weinstein & Susan E. Crowdus, The Effects of Positive
and Negative Information on Person Perception, 21 HUM. REL. 383, 389 (1963) (stating
that the "basic hypothesis that negative information has greater saliency than
positive information for person perception was generally not supported" by
their experiment).
550
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bad acts. Indeed, the "halo effect" of prior convictions and bad acts
would seem to be at its zenith in such a setting-i.e., a group of people,
who do not know the defendant but must decide whether he or she has
engaged in criminal activity, will infer negative characteristics about the
defendant when they receive the noteworthy and negative information
that he or she has previously engaged in criminal activity. According to
attribution theory, the jury that hears about a defendant's prior convic-
tions or bad acts will not consider that evidence solely in terms of the
defendant's credibility, but also will form unfavorable impressions about
the defendant's overall personality and believe that he or she is more
likely to have committed the alleged crime, regardless of the evidence or
lack of evidence presented. 8 Thus, attribution theory indicates that a
defendant who is impeached with prior convictions or bad acts is likely
to be severely prejudiced.
The relevance of attribution theory in the context of a criminal trial
has been buttressed by numerous studies which demonstrate that, all
else being equal, jurors are more likely to convict a defendant who has
been impeached with prior convictions or bad acts. In one study, re-
searchers at the University of Chicago examined the results of 3,576 ac-
tual jury trials and divided those trials into two categories: (1) trials in
which the jury was told that the defendant had no prior convictions; and
(2) trials in which the jury either was told that the defendant had prior
convictions or was told nothing about the defendant's prior convic-
tions.8 2 Overall, the defendant was acquitted in forty-two percent of the
81. See Foster, supra note 11, at 35 (explaining likelihood that jurors will
"attribute overall bad character" to defendant upon learning of defendant's past
bad acts or convictions). This tendency is magnified by the setting in which the
judgments are being made. See Lawson, supra note 64, at 775 (stating that "[tihe
specific setting in which judgment about a person is made bears significantly
upon the evaluation of information about that person"). Indeed, as Professor
Lawson has noted:
U]urors undertake their task already possessing certain general knowl-
edge about the defendant. They know that he was arrested by a police
officer who believed him guilty of a crime, that preliminary proceedings
were held in which grounds were discovered for pursuing a formal
charge, and that an independent body of citizens acting as a grand jury
handed down an indictment.... In this 'setting' they are informed that
[.. (the defendant] has previously engaged in behavior of a similar kind
[to the behavior for which he has been charged] .... In other words,
they are sensitized to respond to information about a defendant's crimi-
nal behavior.
Id. at 775-76.
82. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 159-60 (1986).
This study has been called the "seminal study of actualjurors." People v. Allen,
420 N.W.2d 499, 558 (Mich. 1988) (Riley, C.J., dissenting). It is the only study
on the issue of impeachment which involved actual jurors. Id. at 556 (Riley, C.J.,
dissenting). The first group of trials studied were trials where the defendant
took the stand and had no record or his record was suppressed, and trials where
the defendant did not take the stand but the jury learned he had no record.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra, at 147. The second group included all other trials-
19921
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cases where the jury was told that the defendant had no prior convic-
tions, but was acquitted in only twenty-five percent of the cases where
the jury did not receive such information.8 3 In addition, in cases where
the evidence of guilt was weakest, the defendant was acquitted in sixty-
five percent of the cases where the jury was told that the defendant had
no prior convictions, but was acquitted in only thirty-eight percent of
the cases where the jury did not receive such information.8 4 Based on
the results of this study, one of the researchers involved in the study
concluded that "[t]he jurors almost universally used defendant's record
to conclude he was a bad man and hence was more likely than not guilty
of the crime for which he was then standing trial." 85
The results of the Chicago study have been replicated, to varying
degrees, in numerous subsequent studies. For example, in two studies
conducted by researchers at the University of Toronto, mock jurors who
learned that a defendant had prior convictions for the same or similar
crimes were more likely to convict the defendant than those jurors who
did not receive such information.8 6 Similar results were obtained in a
trials where the defendant took the stand and was impeached with his record,
and trials where the defendant did not take the stand and the jury learned noth-
ing about the defendant's record. Id.
83. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 82, at 161.
84. Id. at 160. The study first divided the trials into nine different catego-
ries based on the seriousness of the charge and the strength of the evidence, and
then compared conviction rates within these nine categories. Id. Because these
two factors were relatively constant, impeachment with prior convictions was
meant to be the only variable factor in the study. Id. at 159 n.17.
85. Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Triak Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70
YALE L.J. 763, 777 n.89 (1961) (quoting Letter from Dale W. Broeder, Associate
Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law, to The Yale Law Journal (Mar.
14, 1960) (on file with the Yale Law Library)). Of course, Professor Broeder's
analysis is not necessarily a correct interpretation of the results of the study.
Indeed, because the study did not differentiate between defendants who were
impeached with prior convictions and defendants who refused to take the stand,
it can be argued that the study tells us relatively little about the degree of preju-
dice resulting from impeachment with prior convictions (as opposed to the de-
gree of prejudice resulting from a defendant's failure to testify). See Allen, 420
N.W.2d at 559 n.23 (Riley, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihis grouping blunts
the effectiveness of drawing conclusions on the basis of impeachment alone").
Subsequent studies have suggested, however, that juries use evidence of prior
convictions as substantive proof of guilt rather than as evidence relating only to
the defendant's credibility. For a discussion of these studies, see infra notes 86-
93 and accompanying text.
86. See Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence
on the Effect of § 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88
(1972-1973); Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evi-
dence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235 (1975-1976).
The Doob and Kirshenbaum study involved 48 mock jurors who read a fact pat-
tern for a breaking and entering case. Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra, at 91-92.
The jurors were divided into the following four groups: (1) jurors who neither
learned about the defendant's prior convictions nor received information about
whether the defendant took the stand; (2) jurors who learned that the defendant
did not testify, but did not learn about the prior convictions; (3) jurors who
[Vol. 37: p. 533
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study conducted by researchers at Boston College.8 7 The Boston Col-
lege study found that mock jurors were generally more likely to convict a
defendant when the jurors learned that the defendant had prior convic-
tions, particularly if the convictions were for the same crime as the crime
for which the defendant was being tried.88 Similar results also were ob-
tained in studies conducted by researchers at the London School of Eco-
nomics and at the University of Georgia.8 9
learned that the defendant testified and had seven convictions for similar crimes;
and (4) jurors who learned that the defendant testified and had seven prior con-
victions, and were given a limiting instruction that the convictions should be
considered only in evaluating the defendant's credibility. Id. at 92-93. The ju-
rors who learned of the prior convictions gave a higher guilt rating to the de-
fendant than the jurors who did not learn of these convictions. Id. at 93.
Ironically, the jurors who were given a limiting instruction gave the highest guilt
rating to the defendant. Id.
The Hans and Doob study involved two different sets of mock jurors: 40
individual mock jurors and 30 four-person groups of mock jurors who read a
fact pattern of a burglary case. Hans & Doob, supra, at 239. In this study, each
set of jurors was divided into two groups. Id. at 240. One group learned that
the defendant had a prior burglary conviction and was given a limiting instruc-
tion; the other group was not informed that the defendant had a prior convic-
tion. Id. Although both sets ofjurors who learned of the prior conviction were
more likely to convict the defendant, this was particularly true in the group set-
ting. Id. at 243.
87. See Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting In-
structions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 37 (1985).
88. Id. at 43. In this study, 80 mock jurors read an auto theft fact pattern;
80 additional mock jurors read a murder fact pattern. Id. at 39-40. Each fact
pattern was further divided into the following four categories: (1) the defendant
had no criminal record; (2) the defendant had a conviction for the same crime;
(3) the defendant had a conviction for a dissimilar crime (i.e., the murder de-
fendant had an auto theft conviction and the auto theft defendant had a murder
conviction); and (4) the defendant had a perjury conviction. Id.
In the auto theft case, the jurors were more likely to convict the defendant if
they learned that the defendant had any prior conviction, particularly if the con-
viction was for auto theft. Id. at 43. In the murder case, the jurors were more
likely to convict the defendant if they learned he had a murder conviction, but
were only equally likely to convict if they learned the defendant had a perjury
conviction, and were less likely to convict if they learned the defendant had an
auto theft conviction. Id. Thus, this study highlights the fact that the prejudice
resulting from impeachment with a prior conviction is most pronounced when
the conviction is for a similar crime, and may be negligible for certain dissimilar
convictions, particularly those for crimes that are considered less serious than
the charged offense.
89. See E. Gil Clary & David R. Shaffer, Effects of Evidence Withholding and a
Defendant's Prior Record on juridic Decisions, 112J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 237, 239 (1980)
(stating that "[tihe result of this investigation [at the University of Georgia] re-
vealed that defendants with a prior record received significantly more votes for
conviction compared to defendants who had no previous convictions"); W.R.
Cornish & A.P. Sealy,Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208, 216-
17. Cornish and Sealy used theft and rape cases for their study. Cornish &
Sealy, supra, at 208. With the theft case, 73% of the mock jurors voted to acquit
when they did not know of the prior conviction; only 43% would have acquitted
when they knew of the prior conviction for a similar crime and were not given a
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Thus, the scientific research has generally shown that criminal de-
fendants who are impeached with prior convictions are more likely to be
convicted, particularly if they are impeached with convictions for crimes
that are the same or similar to the crime for which they are being tried.
The defendant who tries to avoid this prejudice by refusing to testify,
however, may be prejudiced in a different manner. Many studies have
shown that defendants can be substantially prejudiced if they do not tes-
tify for fear of being impeached. In one study, researchers from the Uni-
versity of Georgia found that the defendant's decision not to testify
increased the jurors' confidence that the defendant should be con-
victed. 90 Likewise, surveys of both judges and criminal defense attor-
neys show that those involved in the criminal justice system believe that
defendants who do not testify are more likely to be convicted. 9 1 This
perception appears to be prevalent among the general public as well. 92
Indeed, as one commentator has noted: "[A] juror's natural tendency
[is] to consider what indeed he or she would do if wrongfully charged
with a crime. Silence in the face of a criminal accusation is too far re-
moved from the expected conduct of an innocent person .... 93
Thus, the scientific research indicates that a defendant with prior
convictions or bad acts faces a considerable dilemma. The defendant
will be prejudiced if he or she testifies because the jury will improperly
infer guilt from his or her prior conduct, and the defendant will be
prejudiced if he or she does not testify because the jury will improperly
limiting instruction. Id. at 216-17. With the rape case, 36% of the mock jurors
voted to acquit when they did not know of the prior conviction compared to only
20% who voted to acquit when they knew of the prior conviction for a similar
crime and were not given a limiting instruction. Id.
90. David R. Shaffer & Cyril Sadowsky, Effects of Withheld Evidence on Juridic
Decisions II: Locus of Withholding Strategy, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
40, 42 (1979). Researchers, in monitoring the deliberations of mock jurors,
found that the jurors had greater confidence in convicting the defendant when
the defendant did not testify. Id. at 42. But see Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note
86, at 93. In the Doob & Kirshenbaum study, mock jurors gave the defendant a
lower guilt rating in cases where the defendant did not testify. Id. This result,
however, is not representative of an actual trial in which the defendant does not
testify because the mock jurors in the study were told that the defendant did not
testify because his defense attorney thought that it was not necessary for him to
do so. Id.
91. See, e.g., Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand The Dilemma of the
Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COL. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 215 (1968). Question-
naires were distributed nationally to 99 trial judges and 200 defense attorneys.
Id. at 218 n.29. Of those who responded to the survey, 88% of the defense
attorneys and 89% of the judges believed that a defendant has a better chance of
acquittal if he testifies on his own behalf. Id. at 221. In addition, 94% of the
defense attorneys who responded thought that jurors notice and infer guilt from
a defendant's silence. Id.
92. See LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIvrn AMENDMENT? 21 (1959)(noting that 71% of those questioned in Gallop poll believed that silence
demonstrated guilt).
93. Nichol, supra note 11, at 401.
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infer guilt from his or her silence. The supposed solution to this di-
lemma rests in the use of limiting instructions-instructions that require
the jury to consider prior bad acts or convictions only in determining
the defendant's credibility. 94 The scientific research, however, also
demonstrates that limiting instructions do little, if anything, to amelio-
rate prejudice to a defendant who is impeached with prior convictions or
bad acts.
C. The Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions
The scientific research uniformly demonstrates that juries have diffi-
culty following limiting instructions. 95 In fact, some studies have
demonstrated that limiting instructions not only fail to reduce the preju-
dice resulting from prior convictions and bad acts, but instead increase
the prejudice, possibly by calling the jury's attention to the prior convic-
tions and bad acts. 96
94. Indeed, one student writer noted that the "primary reason for the con-
tinued use of prior conviction evidence for impeachment is that courts adhere to
the proposition that any potential prejudice can be remedied through limiting
instructions." Irwin R. Miller, Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissi-
bility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of
the Defendant Witness, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 168, 171 (1968).
95. See Cheryl J. Oros & Donald Elman, Impact of Judge's Instructions Upon
Jurors' Decisions: The "Cautionary Charge" in Rape Trials, 10 REPRESENTATIVE RES.
Soc. PsYcHoL. 28, 32 (1979) (noting that mock jurors did not follow instruction
to disregard unfavorable character evidence). This phenomenon is true, not
only in the context of impeachment with convictions or bad acts, but also in a
variety of other settings. See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury
Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754 (1959) (noting that mock jurors did not follow
instruction to disregard evidence of defendant's liability insurance; average
damages awarded to defendant increased by approximately 35% when jurors
received such an instruction); Stanley Sue et al., Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on
the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED Soc. PsYcHoL. 345,
350-51 (1973) (noting that mock jurors did not follow instruction to disregard
illegally obtained evidence; introducing such evidence without comment in-
creased conviction rate by 26% while instructing jurors to disregard the evi-
dence increased conviction rate by 35%). According to Dale Broeder, at least in
terms of limiting instructions for damages, "[t]he objection and instruction to
disregard . . . sensitize the jurors" to facts that are pertinent and influential to
their determination. Broeder, supra, at 754.
96. See, e.g., Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 86, at 93 (noting that mockjurors who were given limiting instruction about defendant's prior convictions
gave defendant higher guilt rating than jurors who learned of convictions but
were not given limiting instruction); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig,
Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan
Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 401, 419 (1990) (noting that
instructed jurors are more likely than uninstructed jurors to assume defendant's
guilt based on prior convictions). But see Cornish & Sealy, supra note 89, at 217
(stating that limiting instructions generally reduced percentage of mock jurors
voting to convict defendant). According to Cornish and Sealy, jurors "do take
account of a judicial instruction to disregard similar convictions." Id.
It should be noted that more than 75% of the jurors surveyed in the Michi-
gan Juror Comprehension Project correctly stated that they should not assume
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Moreover, the scientific research also demonstrates that the defend-
ant who is impeached by prior convictions and bad acts is not prejudiced
because his or her credibility as a witness is impaired (the rationale un-
derlying the rule), but because the jury considers such information as
evidence of the defendant's propensity to commit the crime in question.
In the most revealing study on this issue, mock jurors were more likely
to convict a defendant who had a prior conviction for a crime that was
the same as the crime at issue than to convict a defendant who had a
prior perjury conviction, even though a perjury conviction would seem
to be the strongest indicator of the defendant's lack of credibility as a
witness. 9 7 Furthermore, the researchers found that the introduction of
a prior conviction produced no significant change in the mock jurors'
ratings of a defendant's credibility. 9 8 Thus, the researchers concluded
that "[t]he credibility ratings of the defendant did not vary as a function
of prior conviction," but "[c]onviction rates [did vary] . .. as a function
of prior conviction." 99
The results of this psychological and social science research should
come as no surprise to many of the participants in the criminal justice
system. Courts and commentators have long questioned the effective-
ness of limiting instructions, referring to such instructions as a "judicial
the defendant's guilt based on prior convictions. Kramer & Koenig, supra, at
419. Most jurors, therefore, may know that they should not assume guilt based
on prior convictions. The studies demonstrate, however, that jurors tend to as-
sume guilt despite this knowledge. See, e.g., Hans & Doob, supra note 86, at 249.
Despite many jurors' honest convictions in their unbiased, fair consid-
eration of the defendant with a record, the results of the present study
clearly demonstrate the opposite. The juror's perception of impartial-
ity is an illusion-the fact is that the presence of [a criminal] record
prejudices the case against the defendant.
Id.; cf. Wissler & Saks, supra note 87, at 41-43 (stating that 56% of mock jurors
felt that evidence of prior conviction increased likelihood that defendant was
guilty; 13% stated that prior conviction was critical factor in finding defendant
guilty).
97. See Wissler & Saks, supra note 87, at 43. Using a murder case for the
study, the conviction rate was 70% when the mock jurors learned of a prior
murder conviction and only 50% when the jurors learned of a perjury convic-
tion. Id. Using an auto theft case, the conviction rate was 80% when the mockjurors learned of a prior auto theft conviction and only 70% when the jurors
learned of a perjury conviction. Id.; see also Cornish & Sealy, supra note 89, at
216-17 (stating that jurors are more likely to convict rape defendant who had
prior convictions for indecent assaults on girls than to convict rape defendant
who had prior convictions involving dishonesty).
98. Wissler & Saks, supra note 87, at 41; see also Hans & Doob, supra note 86,
at 247 (stating that introduction of prior conviction produced no significant dif-
ference in amount of time defendant's credibility was discussed by mock juries in
their deliberations). The reason for this, according to Hans and Doob, is that
"jurors use [the] record only minimally in considering the issue of credibility."
Id.
99. Wissler & Saks, supra note 87, at 41.
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lie,"' 0 0 a "placebo,"'' and a device that forces jurors to engage in a
"mental gymnastic which is beyond . . . their powers."' 0 2 As Justice
Jackson noted in Krulewitch v. United States, 10 3 "[t]he naive assumption
that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all
practicing lawyers know to be an unmitigated fiction."' 10 4
Limiting instructions, nonetheless, are firmly embedded in our jury
trial system.' 0 5 Courts have upheld the use of such instructions in a
wide variety of situations.1 0 6 Limiting instructions have been prohibited
only in the rare situation where "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to
the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury sys-
tem cannot be ignored."' 1 7 However, in light of the research demon-
strating that a defendant can be substantially prejudiced by the use of
prior convictions and bad acts and that limiting instructions do not cure,
and may even exacerbate this prejudice, reliance on limiting instructions
100. United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank,
J., dissenting) (stating that limiting instruction "undermines a moral relationship
between the courts, the jurors, and the public; it damages the decent judicial
administration of justice"), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
101. United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) (stating
that determination of whether limiting instructions for admitted hearsay evi-
dence are sufficient is "a matter for the exercise of discretion by the trialjudge"), aff'd, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
102. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932); see also Lisa
Eichhorn, Note, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard Evidence
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 342 (1989)(stating that "[plolicies underlying exclusionary rules may be masterfully de-
vised and socially valuable, but they become worthless if juries are unable to
follow the instructions that the policies generate"); Note, The Limiting Instruc-
tion-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REV. 264 (1966) (questioning effec-
tiveness of limiting instructions).
103. 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
104. Id. at 453 (Jackson, J., concurring).
105. See, e.g., Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (noting "crucial
assumption . . . is that juries will follow [limiting] instructions given by the trialjudge."); Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 242 (stating that "[u]nless we proceed on the
basis that the jury will follow the court's [limiting] instructions . . . the jury sys-
tem makes little sense"); see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)
(stating that "[t]he rule that juries are presumed to follow [limiting] ... instruc-
tions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presump-
tion is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical
accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal
justice process").
106. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (upholding limiting
instruction in context of co-defendant confession); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554 (1967) (upholding limiting instruction in context of prior convictions intro-
duced for purpose of sentence enhancement).
107. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (reversing convic-
tion where statement of non-testifying co-defendant implicated defendant; limit-
ing instruction not sufficient to cure prejudice from statement where defendant
could not cross-examine co-defendant about contents of statement).
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seems especially inappropriate in the context of impeachment with prior
convictions and bad acts.
In sum, the scientific research to date casts serious doubt on the
validity of the practice of impeachment with prior convictions and bad
acts. The results of this research have undermined the probative value
of these prior instances of misconduct, have demonstrated the prejudice
to the defendant that results from their use, and have shown that limit-
ing instructions do not properly cure this prejudice. Nonetheless, the
rules permitting such impeachment remain firmly entrenched in the fed-
eral courts and most state courts.' 0 8 The continued vitality of these
rules, therefore, can only be understood by examining some of the
countervailing reasons that underlie impeachment with prior convic-
tions and bad acts.
V. COUNTERVAILING REASONS UNDERLYING IMPEACHMENT WITH PRIOR
CONVICTIONS AND BAD ACTS
Courts and commentators offer several reasons to disregard the sci-
entific research and to instead maintain the practice of impeachment
with prior convictions and bad acts. First, there is considerable skepti-
cism concerning the scientific research itself. Some critics, for example,
point to methodological shortcomings and internal contradictions in-
herent in this research. Second, regardless of the validity of the re-
search, the practice of impeachment with prior convictions and bad acts
has considerable intuitive appeal. Because our system of justice is
based, at least in part, on notions of community support and legitimacy,
this intuitive appeal is a factor that must be considered. Finally, there
are certain situations where impeachment with prior convictions or bad
acts seems likely to further the search for the truth (presumably the par-
amount goal of our system of justice). Indeed, a blanket prohibition
108. Only one state prohibits impeachment with prior convictions in all sit-
uations. See MONT. R. EvID. 609. The Montana rule states: "For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been con-
victed of a crime is not admissible." Id. Moreover, only a few states place signif-
icantly greater restrictions on such impeachment than those contained in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-20 (Michie 1982)(providing that evidence of bad character or prior conviction is inadmissible
"unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in issue"); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1983) (prohibiting impeachment of criminal defendant
unless defendant has introduced evidence solely to support credibility); State v.
Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Haw. 1971) (stating that impeachment of criminal de-
fendant with evidence of prior conviction denies defendant due process under
state and federal constitutions); People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 449 (Mich. 1988)(limiting impeachment to crimes involving dishonesty, false statements and cer-
tain thefts); Commonwealth v. Randall, 528 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1987) (limiting im-
peachment to convictions within last 10 years involving dishonesty or false
statement); State v. McAboy, 236 S.E.2d 431 (W. Va. 1977) (limiting impeach-
ment to crimes involving dishonesty, false statement or to situations where wit-
ness places credibility in issue).
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against the use of prior convictions or bad acts to impeach a defendant
could seriously hinder the truth-seeking process in cases where a de-
fendant has offered evidence to show that he or she is a truthful or law-
abiding person.
A. Skepticism about the Scientific Research
Numerous critics have questioned the reliability of the findings con-
tained in many, if not most, of the studies concerning impeachment with
prior convictions and bad acts. Indeed, even proponents of psycho-
legal research have noted that simulations of the jury process are "im-
perfect tools for answering empirical questions."' 1 9 As these commen-
tators have suggested, there are several reasons to be skeptical about the
findings contained in the psychological and social science literature to
date. First, most of the studies were performed under situations that are
dramatically different from actual jury deliberations. Indeed, only one
of the major studies concerning prejudice from impeachment involved
actual jury trials.' 10 In most of the other studies, individuals were sim-
ply asked to read a short fact pattern about a hypothetical case and reach
a verdict."' 1 Indeed, in one study, individuals were randomly ap-
proached at laundromats, supermarkets, airports, bus terminals and pri-
vate homes in the metropolitan Boston area, 112 and were simply asked
to read a two-page fact pattern and decide whether the defendant was
guilty. 113
Without question, the deliberations conducted in such a situation
differ dramatically from the jury deliberations that occur in an actual
trial. First, the setting is different. Reading a fact pattern about a hypo-
thetical case and a hypothetical defendant while standing in a laundro-
mat is vastly different from the setting of an actual trial where jurors take
an oath before being sworn, are instructed by a judge, hear testimony
109. See, e.g., Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, Methodological Considerations
in the Study of the Psychology of the Courtroom, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURT-
ROOM 287, 318 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982); see also Cornish &
Sealy, supra note 89, at 221 (noting limitations of technique used to study how
variations in rules of evidence may affect jurors' verdicts); Wissler & Saks, supra
note 87, at 46 (noting that caution should be used in generalizing from results of
study which used mock jurors).
110. SeeAllen, 420 N.W.2d at 557 (stating that jury study by Kalven & Zeisel
is only major study involving verdicts in actual jury trials). For a discussion of
this study, see supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 86, at 92 (utilizing 48 men
and women who agreed, after being approached in public place by experi-
menter, to read 400-word hypothetical breaking and entering case); Wissler &
Saks, supra note 87, at 39-41 (utilizing people from general public as mock ju-
rors; individuals in study read hypothetical murder and auto theft cases).
112. Wissler & Saks, supra note 87, at 39-40.
113. Id. The mock jurors read one of two possible fact patterns. Id. at 40-
41. One fact pattern described a hypothetical murder case; the other described
a hypothetical auto theft case. Id.
1992]
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from actual witnesses, and are then asked, after reaching a group con-
sensus, to pronounce ajudgment that will affect the life of a real person.
Clearly, the gravity of the situation and the stakes involved in an actual
trial are much greater than those found in the studies. The results from
the studies, therefore, may not accurately reflect the results that would
be found in actual trials.' 14
Likewise, the fact patterns used in the studies are much simpler and
contain far less information than the factual situations considered byju-
ries in actual trials.' '5 Thus, any information about a defendant's prior
convictions takes on greater prominence in the studies than such infor-
mation would have in an actual trial where the jury would receive much
more information about the facts of the case, would likely hear more
about the defendant's explanation of the event in question, and would
have alternative means of weighing the credibility of the witnesses (e.g.,
the jurors also would be able to observe the witnesses' demeanor in de-
termining their credibility). Finally, because most of the research fo-
cuses only on individual mock jurors, these studies lack the element of
group decision-making that is necessarily part of actual jury
deliberations.' 16
In addition to the methodological shortcomings of the scientific re-
search, some critics contend that this research does not provide a basis
for revising the rules of evidence because there is no consensus within
the scientific community about the probative value of, or prejudice re-
sulting from, the use of prior convictions and bad acts.' 17 For example,
although many researchers have criticized "trait theory" as an explana-
tion of human personality, textbooks continue to include this theory in
their discussion of human personality.' 18 In the same vein, while most
114. See generally John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Criminal Juries, in 2
CRIME ANDJUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 277, 277-86 (Norvall Mor-
ris & Michael Tonry eds., 1980) (questioning accuracy ofjury simulations); Bray
& Kerr, supra note 109, at 287 (describing use of mock jurors for jury research by
social psychologist and examining criticisms of such use).
115. For instance, the fact pattern in the Doob and Kirshenbaum study was
400 words long. Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 86, at 92. The fact pattern in
the Hans and Doob study was one page. Hans & Doob, supra note 86, at 239- 40.
The fact pattern in the Wissler and Saks study was two pages. Wissler & Saks,
supra note 87, at 39-4 1. By contrast, in the experience of the author, a transcript
of a criminal trial routinely exceeds 100 pages and occasionally exceeds 1,000
pages.
116. See, e.g., David A. Sonenshein, Circuit Roulette: The Use of Prior Convic-
tions to Impeach Credibility in Civil Cases Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 279, 298 n.93 (1988) (noting that some studies did not involve
decision-making in group deliberation, which is manner in which jurors perform
their task).
117. See, e.g., David Crump, How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered to
Prove Conduct?, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 279, 283 (1986) (stating that social science
"is by no means monolothic in condemning trait theory" and noting that mod-
ern textbooks teach this theory without categorically rejecting it).
118. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARON & DONN BYRNE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: UN-
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researchers have concluded that a criminal defendant is prejudiced
when he or she is impeached with prior convictions or bad acts or when
he or she does not testify for fear of impeachment, the studies are not
completely consistent on the scope or magnitude of this prejudice. In-
deed, in one study, a defendant in a murder case who was impeached
with an auto theft conviction was less likely to be convicted than a de-
fendant who was not impeached. 1 19 Similarly, in another study, a de-
fendant who did not testify was less likely to be convicted than a
defendant who testified and was not impeached with any conviction. 120
Notwithstanding these criticisms, members of the psychological and
social science communities are in general agreement about a number of
issues concerning impeachment with prior convictions and bad acts.
First, although there are differences of opinion among psychologists
about the measurement of human behavior, most agree that prior con-
victions and bad acts bear little, if any, relation to testimonial credibil-
ity.12' Second, most researchers concur that a defendant is prejudiced,
at least to some extent, by the introduction of prior convictions and bad
acts or by the defendant's refusal to testify for fear of impeachment. 12 2
Finally, researchers almost universally believe that limiting instructions
fail to cure the prejudice that results from impeachment of the defend-
ant with prior acts of misconduct or from the defendant's failure to tes-
tify.' 23 Thus, while critics can point out methodological shortcomings
DERSTANDING HUMAN INTERACTION 527-61 (4th ed. 1984) (presenting trait theory
as not in conflict with social psychology theory, but rather as providing different
approach to study of psychology), E. JERRY PHARES, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY:
CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND PROFESSION (4th ed. 1992) (same); see also Leonard,
supra note 16, at 37-38 (stating that "there is still disagreement in the psycholog-
ical community about the nature of personality and its predictive value"). For a
discussion and criticism of trait theory, see supra notes 58-76 and accompanying
text.
119. Wissler & Saks, supra note 87, at 43; see also Cornish & Sealy, supra note
89, at 216-17 (stating that in rape case,jurors are less likely to convict defendant
with prior conviction for dissimilar crime than to convict defendant whose rec-
ord they did not know).
120. Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 86, at 93. It should be noted, how-
ever, that this study may not be representative of an actual trial in which the
defendant does not testify. In contrast to a real trial situation, the mock jurors in
the study had been told that the defendant did not testify because his defense
attorney thought that it was not necessary for him to testify. Id.
121. See Foster, supra note 11, at 32 (stating that "[allthough psychologists
presently do not agree as to precisely what mixture of facts shapes behavior ...
[s]ocial psychology data reflect the conclusion that prior convictions have virtu-
ally no probative value as a predictor for determining a witness' in-court verac-
ity"); Leonard, supra note 16, at 61 (stating that "[w]hile psychological experts
have reached no consensus about the appropriate means of viewing and measur-
ing character, they do agree about the inaccuracy of the law's conception of
character"). For a further discussion of the relation of bad acts and prior convic-
tions to testimonial credibility, see supra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
122. For a further discussion of this prejudicial effect, see supra notes 77-93
and accompanying text.
123. For a further discussion of the efficacy of limiting instructions, see
19921
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in some of the scientific research and can also note that there are differ-
ences of opinion concerning the results of this research, the scientific
research considered in its entirety does undermine the validity of im-
peachment with prior convictions and bad acts.
Moreover, even if the scientific research does not "prove" that prior
convictions and bad acts lack probative value, this research certainly
should inform the debate about the validity of impeachment with such
acts. 124 As they now stand, some of our rules of evidence appear to be
grounded on unstudied assumptions of human nature that generally
have been rejected by those who have tested the actual effects of the
rules of evidence on human behavior and decision-making. 12 5 Thus,
while skepticism towards the scientific research may be justified to some
degree, it does not provide a sufficient basis to reject the findings con-
tained in this research or to continue impeachment practices in their
current configuration under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
B. Legitimacy and Catharsis
Although the search for truth is presumed to be a paramount func-
tion of any trial, trials cannot be understood solely as a scientific search
for an objective "truth." 126 Rather, trials also function as a means of
supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text. But see Cornish & Sealy, supra note
89, at 216-17 (stating that mock jurors less likely to convict defendant when
given limiting instructions).
124. Concern about the validity of this evidence has been recognized by
some courts. One court has stated:
The proposition that felons perjure themselves more than other, simi-
larly situated witnesses . . .is one of many important empirical asser-
tions about law that [has] never been tested, and may be false. It is
undermined, though not disproved, by psychological studies which
show that moral conduct in one situation is not highly correlated with
moral conduct in another.
Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Beaver & Marques,
supra note 11, at 614 (proposing that, "[b]ecause the legal system has not devel-
oped its own experimental system," it should turn to "psychologists and sociolo-
gists [who] have developed an impressive research against which the legal
system can test its assumptions").
125. See People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 510 (Mich. 1988) (stating that
rule allowing impeachment of defendants with evidence of any prior felony con-
viction was "the result of assumptions about jury behavior and the effectiveness
of limiting instructions that were accompanied by relatively little analysis or
study").
126. Even if trials were designed solely to determine the "truth" about
some past event and to make judgments based on this objectively discovered
truth, the discovery of such a truth would often be an elusive, and illusory, goal.
Indeed, as one commentator has noted:
The factual events . . .happened in the past. They do not walk into
court. The court usually learns about these real, objective, past facts
only through the oral testimony of fallible witnesses. Accordingly, the
court, from hearing the testimony, must guess at the actual, past
facts.... There can be no assurance that ... that guess[] will coincide
with those actual, past facts.
562 [Vol. 37: p. 533
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peacefully resolving disputes, of giving people with grievances their
"day in court," of assigning blame to people who have transgressed so-
ciety's norms, and of vindicating those people who have been charged
with crimes that they did not commit. Thus, trials also "serve to satisfy
the community that order prevails and that justice is being done."' 127
Indeed, one commentator has referred to the dispute-resolution func-
tion of a trial as a means of providing the community with a non-violent
form of "catharsis." 128
This cathartic role of the legal system would be greatly reduced,
however, if people believed that trials produced unfair or unjust results.
Indeed, if people believed the system to be unfair, they might be less
willing to resolve their disputes through the court process and might
instead resolve their disputes through other, perhaps less peaceful,
means.' 2 9 The legitimacy of, and trust in, the trial process, therefore,
must be maintained at a high level if trials are to serve the cathartic func-
tions that they were designed, at least in part, to serve. 130 Furthermore,
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 15-
16 (1973). Similarly, Justice Traynor has stated: "[N]o scientific method of in-
quiry can ever be devised to produce facsimiles that bring the past to life. The
judicial process deals with probabilities, not facts ...." RogerJ. Traynor, Fact
Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 636 (1958).
127. Leonard, supra note 16, at 39; see also 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KEN-
NETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5025 (1977) (stating that a
trial "is not a scientific mechanism but a political event, a method of resolving
disputes by invoking community values as well as shared visions of the truth").
Professor Tribe also has expressed this idea of a trial serving community needs:
Far from being either barren or obsolete, much of what goes on in the
trial of a lawsuit-particularly in a criminal case-is partly ceremonial
or ritualistic in [a] deeply positive sense, and partly educational as well;
procedure can serve a vital role as conventionalized communication
among a trial's participants, and as something like a reminder to the
community of the principles it holds important.
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1391-92 (1971).
128. Leonard, supra note 16, at 3. Other trial procedures are also seen as
having psychic benefit. According to Professor Weinstein: "Although the hear-
say rule has its main justification in truthfinding, some of its vitality is due to its
psychic value to litigants, who feel that those giving testimony against them
should do it publicly and face to face." Jack B. Weinstein, Some Difficulties in De-
vising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 245
(1966).
129. See Leonard, supra note 16, at 39 (stating that evidentiary rules must
produce conclusions that "we accept with enough confidence and satisfaction
that we will not substitute individualized forms of justice for the peaceful
processes of the legal system").
130. On the other hand, many disputes can and should be resolved without
resort to our court system. Indeed, numerous commentators have complained
of the litigiousness of American society and have urged alternative methods of
dispute resolution that do not involve the use of the judicial process. See, e.g.,
Paul Marcotte, Avoiding Courts, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1990, at 27, 27 (stating that arbi-
tration is considered by potential litigants to be less expensive and more equita-
ble than courtroom litigation); Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial:
1992]
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it is the perception that trials produce equitable results, rather than scien-
tific proof of such results, that is the critical factor in fostering commu-
nity support and systemic legitimacy.' 3 1 Thus, considerations of
legitimacy and catharsis would not be served by a system of rules that
had support in the scientific community but lacked support in the com-
munity at large.' 3 2
In the context of impeachment practices, there is considerable intui-
tive support for the proposition that a jury should be allowed to know
the criminal background of a witness whose testimony they are being
asked to believe.' 33 Therefore, a rule that prohibited such impeach-
ment in all situations, even if scientifically valid, might lessen the percep-
tion that the judicial process is legitimate and thereby diminish the
cathartic role that the process currently serves.
On the other hand, the cathartic value of impeachment with prior
convictions and bad acts, or at least the magnitude of this cathartic
value, should be questioned. It is not at all certain that a ban on im-
peachment practices would have a widespread effect on either commu-
nity support or systemic legitimacy because it is unlikely that most jurors
know and understand current impeachment practices.4'3 Furthermore,
Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1087
(1990) (noting that courts and legislatures have begun to mandate methods of
alternative dispute resolution to alleviate time consuming and expensive court-
room adjudication).
131. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundations of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1786, 1807 (1980). According to this student author:
Society needs to have confidence in the outcomes produced by its sys-
tem of adjudication. Criminal law most clearly dramatizes this need;
when we contemplate punishment that deprives one of liberty, prop-
erty, or even life, the perception of fairness is essential to quiet our collec-
tive conscience. Social acceptance is a function of how the system is
perceived, and not of how it actually performs.
Id. Other commentators also emphasize the importance of community percep-
tion. See Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1979).
In an earlier time, trial by ordeal may have functioned effectively as a
means of adjudication, not because it produced true results, but be-
cause the populace thought it did, and therefore respected its re-
sults. . . . [A]uthoritative resolution [of disputes] might even today
seem to be the real goal, with ascertainment of the truth but a useful
means to that end.
Id.
132. See Leonard, supra note 16, at 41.
Catharsis, then, is not achieved solely through the operation of ration-
ality. It is an emotional response, hinging on our sense of satisfaction
with the processes of the court .... Were the courts to reverse the rules
on the basis of [scientific] opinion, we might not be sufficiently satisfied
with the trial process to maintain our belief in its legitimacy.
Id.
133. For a discussion of this support, see supra notes 59-61 and accompany-
ing text.
134. See Kramer & Koenig, supra note 96, at 419. In this study, only slightly
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there has been no evidence of widespread public disapproval in those
jurisdictions where impeachment with prior convictions and bad acts has
been banned or sharply limited.' 3 5
Thus, while impeachment with prior convictions and bad acts may
foster legitimacy and catharsis, this practice might not do so to any
meaningful degree. Accordingly, these considerations do not provide a
sufficient basis for maintaining our current impeachment practices in
light of the limited probative value and considerable prejudice that stem
from impeachment with most prior convictions and bad acts.
C. Advancement of the Truth-Seeking Process
Impeachment with prior convictions or bad acts can have significant
probative value in certain cases. There are two situations in which im-
peachment with prior convictions or bad acts arguably advances the
truth-seeking process without creating an excessive risk of improper
propensity inferences. The first situation involves impeachment with
prior convictions or bad acts that include dishonesty as an element of
the crime (e.g., convictions for perjury or false statements). Indeed,
most courts and commentators have argued that crimes involving dis-
honesty are the best predictors of testimonial veracity and have the low-
est risk of undue prejudice. 13 6 As one court has explained:
Most crimes can . . . be seen as evidence of a lack of veracity
only when mediated through the belief that the individual has a
bad general character. This results in both a low probative
value and a strong potential for prejudice, as it will be difficult
for jurors to put out of their minds the very step which allowed
them to reach their conclusion as to veracity. On the other
hand, crimes having an element of dishonesty or false state-
ment are directly probative of a witness' truthfulness and at the
same time present little possibility for prejudice since they can
be understood as such, absent the mediation of the conclusion
that the witness-accused is of bad general character.' 3 7
There are, however, many reasons to limit impeachment with
more than one-quarter of the uninstructed jurors understood how to evaluate
the evidence of the defendant's prior convictions. Id.
135. See People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 518 (Mich. 1988) (discussing
states that have prohibited or curtailed such impeachment).
136. See, e.g., id. at 516 (stating that "crimes having an element of dishon-
esty or false statement are directly probative of a witness' truthfulness"); State v.
McAboy, 236 S.E.2d 431, 437 (W. Va. 1977) (stating that "convictions [for per-jury or false swearing] go[] directly to the credibility of the defendant"); Mason
Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 179-80 (1946) (stat-
ing that relationship ofcrimenfalsi "to veracity is self-evident"). But see Wissler &
Saks, supra note 87, at 43 (stating that defendants are less likely to be convicted
when impeached with perjury convictions than with convictions for same crime).
137. Allen, 420 N.W.2d at 506.
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crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. First, as noted earlier,
considerable research indicates that lying is not a consistent character
trait. 138 Thus, a person who has been convicted of a crime involving
dishonesty may be no more likely to lie on the witness stand than a per-
son who has not previously been convicted of such a crime. 139 Indeed,
someone who has been convicted for perjury might be less likely to lie
again on the witness stand than a person who has not been convicted of
such a crime, because he or she is more acutely aware of the conse-
quences that flow from committing perjury.
Second, there are reasons other than a predisposition for dishon-
esty that may cause a person to lie on the witness stand. As one com-
mentator noted:
Most people lie occasionally. They lie on important matters
and under oath in direct proportion to their interests and in-
verse proportion to their belief that the truth can be objectively
demonstrated .... [I]t seems quite likely that a guilty person
without prior convictions will lie on the stand as readily as will a
guilty veteran, while innocent people with extensive criminal
histories will testify as truthfully as the innocent novice. 140
Thus, the likelihood that a defendant is lying in court may weli be deter-
mined more by the facts of the particular case than by the defendant's
alleged propensity for dishonesty.
Third, in most cases, introduction of evidence of prior convictions
and bad acts is not necessary to effectively impeach the testimony of a
criminal defendant. To the contrary, a cross-examiner can utilize a wide
variety of techniques to attack the credibility of the defendant's testi-
mony. For example, a prosecutor may introduce a defendant's prior in-
consistent statements, may point out defects in a defendant's memory or
capacity to observe, or may demonstrate the implausibility of a defend-
ant's alibi. 14 ' In addition, a prosecutor can highlight a fact that the jury
138. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 11, at 29 n.32 (stating that character traits
cannot predict reactions to different situations). For a further discussion of the
relevance or irrelevance of character traits to behavior prediction, see supra
notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., HARTSHORNE & MAY, supra note 70, at 411 (refuting theory
that deceit and honesty are "unified character traits"); see also Beaver & Marques,
supra note 11, at 611 (stating that "[c]rimes of dishonesty are not much higher in
probative value than crimes of violence"); Miguel A. Mendez, California's New
Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psycho-
logical Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1003, 1052 (1984) (stating that "evidence that
a witness has been convicted of a felony involving dishonesty or has cheated on
his taxes may or may not tell us anything about whether he was truthful on the
stand").
140. Uviller, supra note 2, at 867-68 (footnotes omitted).
141. For a discussion of other methods of possible cross-examination and
alternative impeachment methods, see Beaver & Marques, supra note 11, at 614-
15; Foster, supra note 11, at 26.
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most assuredly already knows-the defendant's interest in the outcome
of the case-to undermine the defendant's credibility. 14 2 Thus, there
are many methods of cross-examination, other than impeachment with
prior convictions and bad acts, that can undermine a defendant's credi-
bility without causing the trier of fact to engage in improper propensity
inferences.' 43
Finally, impeachment with prior acts involving dishonesty or false
statement carries a substantial risk of undue prejudice when a defendant
is on trial for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement.14 4 Thus,
even though prior convictions and bad acts involving dishonesty might
shed the most light on a defendant's credibility as a witness, these prior
instances of misconduct still are likely to have limited probative value,
are not necessary to undermine the defendant's credibility as a witness,
and can lead the trier of fact to engage in improper propensity infer-
ences. Accordingly, impeachment of criminal defendants with such
prior instances of misconduct is not warranted.
There is, however, one situation in which impeachment with prior
convictions and bad acts does appear to significantly further the truth-
seeking process-where a defendant affirmatively introduces evidence
showing that he or she is a law-abiding person or has a character for
truthfulness. For example, it would seriously skew the truth-seeking
process to prohibit impeachment with prior convictions in a situation
where a defendant denies that he or she has ever used drugs, even
though the defendant has prior convictions for drug possession. 14 5
142. In fact, jury instructions typically inform jurors that they may consider
the defendant's interest in the outcome of the case in weighing the defendant's
credibility. See, e.g., COMM. ON MODEL.JURY INSTRUCTIONS NINTH CIRCUIT, MAN-
UAL OF MODELJURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 3.08 (1985) (stating
that, in determining credibility of witness, "you may take into account . . .
[whether] the witness [had] an interest in the outcome of this case or any bias or
prejudice concerning any party or any matter involved in the case); CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Instruction 2.11 (3d ed.
1978) (stating that, "[i]n reaching a conclusion as to the credibility of any wit-
ness, and in weighing the testimony of any witness, you may consider . . .
whether the witness has any motive for not telling the truth . . . [and] whether
the witness has any interest in the outcome of this case").
143. Indeed, the psychological research indicates that a defendant's credi-
bility is low even if he or she is not impeached with a prior conviction. In the
most revealing study on this issue, mock jurors rated a defendant's credibility as
being significantly lower than the credibility of all other witnesses, even where
the defendant was not impeached with a prior conviction. Wissler & Saks, supra
note 87, at 40-41 (credibility of non-defendant witnesses rated twice as high as
credibility of defendant who was not impeached with prior convictions).
144. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(recognizing that convictions for crime that is same or similar to charged crime
should be admitted "sparingly" because of risk of undue prejudice).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1345 (11 th Cir.
1990). In Cardenas, the court upheld the impeachment of a defendant with evi-
dence of prior drug dealings where the defendant had denied that he had ever
sold drugs. Id. The court noted: "Rule 608(b) should not stand as a bar to the
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Likewise, a prohibition against impeachment with prior convictions
would thwart the truth-seeking process where a defendant introduces
evidence showing that he or she has never lied, even though the defend-
ant has a prior perjury conviction. In these situations, the probative
value of the prior convictions or bad acts is unmistakable, because the
defendant has explicitly put into evidence a proposition that is directly
contradicted by the prior conviction or bad act.146
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
As set forth above, serious criticisms have been directed toward the
practice of impeachment with prior convictions and bad acts. These
criticisms have focused on the practice's lack of probative value, its po-
tential for impermissible propensity inferences, and the inefficacy of lim-
iting instructions to cure resulting prejudice. There are, however,
countervailing reasons supporting the use of this type of impeachment
evidence. These reasons include the intuitive appeal of impeachment
practices, the skepticism toward the findings of the scientific community,
and considerations of legitimacy and catharsis served by impeachment
with those prior convictions that are most widely believed to advance the
truth-seeking process. To reconcile the criticisms of these impeachment
practices with the countervailing reasons supporting their usage, this au-
thor recommends that Rules 608 and 609 be realigned to allow im-
peachment with prior convictions or bad acts only when a witness
affirmatively introduces evidence supporting his or her credibility as a
witness. 147
admission of evidence introduced to contradict, and which the jury might find
disproves, a witness' testimony as to a material issue in the case." Id. (quoting
United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 1979)).
146. Indeed, even courts that have limited impeachment with prior convic-
tions have noted that such convictions may be admissible if the defendant affirm-
atively introduces evidence of his law-abiding or truthful character. See, e.g.,
State v. McAboy, 236 S.E.2d 431 (W. Va. 1977). According to the West Virginia
Supreme Court: "[I]f the defendant elected to place his good character in issue,
evidence of prior convictions could then be introduced along with other relevant
evidence bearing on bad character." Id. at 437.
147. Although this Article focuses on impeachment of criminal defendants,
this rule would apply to all witnesses. While it is arguable that criminal defend-
ants deserve special protection from impeachment because of the unique degree
of prejudice they face if convicted, a rule that establishes a different standard of
admissibility for criminal defendants could distort the fact-finding process. The
danger of such an approach lies in the fact that jurors might give a defendant's
unimpeached testimony more credibility than the testimony of a non-defendant
witness whose credibility was impeached with prior convictions admitted under a
lower standard of admissibility. See Uviller, supra note 2, at 873 (stating that such
a rule would "undercut[] its own rationale of relevance if it permits a defendant
to testify shorn of his criminal past while a witness against him takes the stand
with his credibility encumbered by his unredacted history"); Christian A.
Bourgeacq, Note, Impeachment with Prior Convictions Under Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a)(1): A Plea for Balance, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 469, 470 (1985) (stating that
Rule 609(a)(1) creates "serious evidentiary imbalance" where defense may auto-
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A. Realignment of Rules 608 and 609
The proposed rule would allow a witness to be impeached with evi-
dence of any prior conviction or bad act that directly contradicts evi-
dence that a witness affirmatively and explicitly introduces to show that
he or she has a law-abiding or truthful character. Under this formula-
tion, the government would be able to impeach a criminal defendant
who testifies that he or she has never used drugs with evidence of a prior
drug conviction, but would not be able to introduce a prior perjury con-
viction if the defendant has not explicitly introduced evidence concern-
ing his or her character for truthfulness. Likewise, the government
would be able to impeach a defendant who claims that he or she has
never killed a person with a prior murder conviction, and would be able
to impeach a defendant who testifies that he or she has never lied with a
prior perjury conviction. The government would not, however, be able
to introduce evidence of other convictions that did not directly refute
the defendant's claims.
In addition, a court would no longer have to balance the probative
value and the prejudicial impact of the convictions and bad acts admissi-
ble under this rule. Rather, the test would be simple and straightfor-
ward-such acts would be admissible whenever a witness affirmatively
introduces evidence to show that he or she has a law-abiding or truthful
character. This provision is justified because impeachment under the
proposed rule would not automatically deter a criminal defendant from
testifying; it only would deter the defendant from affirmatively introduc-
ing evidence that could be directly contradicted through impeachment
with prior convictions and bad acts. Because no witness has a right to
present false evidence without challenge, 148 and because the inability to
challenge such false evidence would seriously skew the truth-seeking
function paramount in our trial structure, a per se policy allowing im-
peachment in these situation is warranted.
matically impeach government witness, yet conceal defendant's conviction and
possibly those of defense witnesses); see also United States v. Jackson, 405 F.
Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (prohibiting impeachment of defendant with assault
conviction, but only if defendant did not put on evidence concerning his un-
blemished past and sought prior approval from court before impeaching gov-
ernment witnesses with prior assault convictions).
148. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986) (holding that defendant
does not have right to introduce false testimony; counsel could withdraw where
defendant wished to introduce such testimony); United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620, 629 (1980) (holding that defendant can be impeached with improperly
obtained confession when he introduces evidence that is directly contradicted by
improperly obtained confession; stating that proper functioning of adversary
system mandates that "when a defendant takes the stand, the government be
permitted proper and effective cross-examination in an attempt to elicit the
truth"); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (upholding use of incon-
sistent non-Mirandized statements for impeachment purposes; stating that while
criminal defendants are privileged to testify in their defense, "that privilege can-
not be construed to include the right to commit perjury").
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Finally, the proposed rule would not contain any time limitation on
the prior convictions and bad acts that could be used to contradict evi-
dence introduced by a witness to support his or her credibility. This
provision is needed to prevent a witness from being able to introduce,
without fear of contradiction, false evidence supporting his or her credi-
bility simply because a prior act falls outside a particular time limit for
admissibility. For example, a defendant might testify that he or she has
never lied. A twelve-year old perjury conviction, although not likely to
be admissible under the current rules, 14 9 would be admissible under the
proposed rule because it would directly contradict evidence that the de-
fendant has explicitly and affirmatively put into issue. 150
B. Possible Criticisms of the Proposed Rule
One possible criticism of this proposed rule is that it treats convic-
tions and non-conviction bad acts in an equivalent manner. Critics
might argue that non-conviction wrongs should be admitted into evi-
dence more sparingly than convictions because non-conviction wrongs
have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, according
to this argument, a jury might hear evidence of bad acts for which there
is little proof and might thereby use unreliable evidence to determine
that a defendant's testimony is not credible.
A second criticism might urge greater restrictions on the use of
non-conviction wrongs because these acts cannot be proved as easily as
convictions, and the admission of such acts could therefore lead to un-
due delay and confusion of the issues. In contrast to a conviction which
can be proved quickly through resort to an official record, 15 1 a non-con-
viction wrong would have to be proved through the testimony of wit-
nesses if the defendant did not admit the commission of the bad act, a
process that could both greatly extend the length of the trial and divert
the jury's attention from the issue of guilt in the case at hand.
Neither of these criticisms, however, mandate separate provisions
for convictions and non-conviction wrongs because these problems can
effectively be handled under the current rules. For example, a prior
149. For a discussion of time restrictions in the current Rule, see supra
notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
150. Some might argue that time limitations are warranted because very old
convictions and bad acts are less directly tied to a witness's present credibility
than a recent act of misconduct. For example, a 20-year-old conviction has less
probative value than a conviction rendered one month before a witness testifies.
While time limits are warranted under the current Rules because these Rules
allow impeachment with prior acts regardless of the nature of the defendant's
testimony, such limits would not be warranted under the proposed rule because
prior acts would not be admissible unless a defendant chose to make these acts
relevant by introducing evidence that could be directly contradicted by these
prior acts.
151. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (22) (creating exception to hearsay rule for judg-
ments of prior convictions).
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non-conviction wrong is not unreliable simply because it is not the sub-
ject of a conviction. Rather, such acts, like prior bad acts admitted
under Rule 404(b), must still be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence in order to be admissible at trial. 152
Likewise, considerations of delay and confusion of the issues do not
dictate a more stringent standard of admissibility for non-conviction
wrongs. To the contrary, Rule 608(b) already prohibits extrinsic evi-
dence of a non-conviction wrong to impeach a witness' general character
for truthfulness. 153 In addition, under the collateral evidence rule, ex-
trinsic evidence cannot be introduced to impeach a witness who affirma-
tively introduces evidence supporting his or her credibility unless the
evidence concerns a non-collateral, material issue in the trial.154 Finally,
Rule 403 currently allows a court to exclude evidence "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger ... of confusion of the
issues .... or by considerations of undue delay."i 15 5
Thus, the possible criticisms against consolidating Rules 608 and
609 can be met by existing prohibitions against extrinsic evidence to
impeach a witness on collateral issues and by existing provisions requir-
ing a threshold level of proof before evidence of a non-conviction wrong
is admissible. Conversely, the truth-seeking process would be enhanced
by the creation of a single rule that would limit the admissibility of prior
convictions under Rule 609 and prior bad acts under Rule 608 to those
situations where the prior instances of misconduct directly contradict
evidence supporting the witness' credibility.
152. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988) (holding
that evidence of prior bad acts should be admitted if there is sufficient evidence
for jury to reasonably find that person committed act). This same standard is
used to test the admissibility of other types of evidence. See, e.g., Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (holding that proponent must prove co-
conspirator statement by preponderance of evidence to satisfy threshold admis-
sibility requirement); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986) (requiring
preponderance standard for waiver of Miranda rights); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 444 n.5 (1984) (requiring preponderance standard for inevitable discovery
of illegally seized evidence); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974)
(requiring preponderance standard for voluntariness of consent to search); Lego
v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 (1972) (requiring preponderance standard for
voluntariness of confession).
153. For a discussion of Rule 608(b), see supra notes 52-57 and accompany-
ing text.
154. Under the collateral evidence rule, extrinsic evidence cannot be intro-
duced to impeach a witness on a collateral matter. See, e.g., United States v.
Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219, 1223 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that prohibition of ex-
trinsic evidence under 608(b) is consistent with "long-standing doctrine that a
witness may not be impeached with extrinsic evidence as to a collateral matter"),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1978); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 50, § 47 (stating
that "prohibition against contradiction as to collateral matters is one of the con-
cepts gathered together in Rule 403").
155. FED. R. EviD. 403.
1992]
39
Okun: Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign Federal Rules of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VII. CONCLUSION
Our trial system, as embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
tries to accomplish two often contradictory goals. On the one hand, the
rules are designed to ensure that we try cases rather than people. On
the other hand, the rules also are designed to further the truth-seeking
process by maximizing the amount of relevant information we provide
to our triers of fact. In the context of impeachment with prior convic-
tions and bad acts, the Rules of Evidence attempt to accommodate these
competing principles by limiting the use of prior convictions and bad
acts so that the jury can consider them only in terms of the defendant's
credibility, and not as proof of his or her underlying guilt.
The problem with the rules as they are currently constituted, how-
ever, is that they allow impeachment of the criminal defendant with a
whole host of prior convictions and bad acts that are only marginally
related to the defendant's credibility, or that are too likely to cause ajury
to find the defendant guilty because he or she is the sort of person who
commits crime. Therefore, this Article recommends that the rules be
revised so that the admissibility of prior convictions and bad acts is lim-
ited to those situations where they most measurably advance the truth-
seeking process-where they directly contradict evidence that a witness
has affirmatively put into issue. Limiting impeachment to such situa-
tions would most fully protect a defendant from improper propensity
inferences and, at the same time, would maximize a jury's ability to de-
termine what actually occurred in a given case, "to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."' 156
156. FED. R. EvID. 102.
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